Positive Peace in the Middle East by Boersema, David
Pacific University
CommonKnowledge
All CAS Faculty Scholarship Faculty Scholarship (CAS)
11-2011
Positive Peace in the Middle East
David Boersema
Pacific University
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.pacificu.edu/casfac
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons
This Academic Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship (CAS) at CommonKnowledge. It has been accepted for
inclusion in All CAS Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of CommonKnowledge. For more information, please contact
CommonKnowledge@pacificu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Boersema, David, "Positive Peace in the Middle East" (2011). All CAS Faculty Scholarship. Paper 52.
http://commons.pacificu.edu/casfac/52
Positive Peace in the Middle East
Description
Drawing on the work of peace theorist Johan Galtung, I will suggest in this talk that real peace in the Middle
East can be achieved only by addressing what Galtung has identified as six dimensions of violence: (1)
physical vs. non-physical violence, (2) negative vs. positive aspects of violence, (3) who/what is the object of
violence, (4) who/what is the subject of violence, (5) intended vs. unintended violence, and (6) manifest vs.
latent violence. However, I will also argue that Galtung's dimensions are not adequate to produce positive
peace. The thesis herein, then, is modest: a necessary condition for positive peace in the Middle East is the
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Drawing on the work of peace theorist Johan Galtung, I will suggest in this talk that real 
peace in the Middle East can be achieved only by addressing what Galtung has identified 
as six dimensions of violence: (1) physical vs. non-physical violence, (2) negative vs. 
positive aspects of violence, (3) who/what is the object of violence, (4) who/what is the 
subject of violence, (5) intended vs. unintended violence, and (6) manifest vs. latent 
violence. However, I will also argue that Galtung's dimensions are not adequate to 
produce positive peace. The thesis herein, then, is modest: a necessary condition for 






The first decade of the 21st century saw a generational change in governmental leadership 
in a number of countries in the Middle East: Jordan’s King Hussain, who had ruled since 
1952, died in 1999, as did Morocco’s King Hassan II. In 2000 Hafez al-Asad, leader of 
Syria for more than two decades, died. In 2003 Iraq’s Saddam Hussein was overthrown 
by the United States (along with Coalition forces), after he had ruled the country since the 
late 1970s. This was followed in 2004 by the death of Sheikh Zayad bin Sultan al-Nahyan 
in the UAE, who had ruled since the country’s founding in 1971. In the same year 
Palestine’s Yasir Arafat died, after having led the PLO (and later, the Palestinian 
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Authority) for more than three decades. At the beginning of this year, 2011, Tunesia’s 
Zene bin Ali was driven from office, after holding power since the 1980s, as was Egypt’s 
Hosni Mubarek, following a 30-year run as that country’s president, and, most recently, 
Libya’s Moamar Qadhafi, in power since 1969. Protests in Yemen led to the resignation 
of its president, Salih, and protests in Bahrain have led to military responses there by the 
leadership against civilian protesters. Even in Syria, long thought to be rather immune to 
civil protest ever since Hafez-al-Asad’s bloody crackdown on protests in the early 1980s, 
open challenges to Bashir Asad point to it being the latest bloom of the Arab Spring (at 
the time of this writing, November 2011). 
 While some of these transitions that have occurred over the past decade or so have 
been peaceful (for example, neither Zayad’s nor the elder Asad’s deaths were the result 
of violence or being ousted), they nonetheless mark a generational transition. This 
transition is not necessarily one that will not result in a new generation of long-lasting 
political leaders. For example, King Muhammad VI has ruled Morocco since his father’s 
death in 1999, as has Jordan’s King Abdullah II. (In addition, although his regime is 
presently undergoing severe unrest, Syria’s Bashir Asad has ruled since 2000.) For that 
matter, although the individuals have been varied, as opposed to a single person, Israel’s 
government has, for the most part, been right-of-center since Menachim Begin and the 
Likud Party took office in the late 1970s. Likewise, with the plausible suggestion of the 
exception of Mohammad Khatami from 1997-2005, Iran’s government has been 
relatively unchanged since its 1979 Islamic Revolution. All of this is to say that at the 
beginning of the 21st century, a generation of peoples in the Middle East was accustomed 
to living under long-standing political regimes and personages.  
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Many young people, in particular, at the beginning of this current century, are 
calling out for a change in living conditions, with some – although not all – of that calling 
for change including a change in political leadership and structure. The call is less 
directly for change in political leadership and more for political reform (or for change in 
political leadership as a means of political reform), with the real goal being an 
enhancement of people’s everyday lives and opportunities. For instance, while there was 
a loud cry for the removal of bin Ali in Tunisia and for Mubarek in Egypt, there has been 
very little cry for the removal of, say Qabus ibn Said in Oman, even though he has ruled 
there since 1970. Nor are their sustained protests against the al-Thani family in Qatar, 
even though this sheikhdom has been in place for decades, nor any significant protests 
against the Saud family in Saudi Arabia. With this claim that it is the enhancement of 
everyday lives and opportunities that is the goal, and change in political leadership that is 
seen as a means to that goal, I want to speak about the concept of positive peace and then 
relate that concept to matters of the Middle East. 
 
2. Positive Peace and Galtung’s Dimensions of Peace 
Sadly, peace is typically taken to be a “secondary” concept, a derivative of the more 
primary concept of violence. That is to say, “peace” is typically defined as the absence of 
violence, rather than the other way around. Peace theorists have long spoken of peace as 
the absence of violence in a variety of ways. For example, they have distinguished 
between organized violence and unorganized violence, with peace subsequently defined 
along those terms. Organized violence, of course, includes war, whether between States 
or within them. Unorganized violence includes such direct, physical, personal violence as 
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interpersonal killings, assaults, rapes, abuse, etc. The term “negative peace” is used, then, 
to speak of a state of affairs in which there is an absence of such violence, whether it is 
organized or unorganized. For instance, some would claim that, say, Canada is at peace 
today because it is not at war (that is, it is not engaged in organized violence). Others, 
however, claim that Canada is not really at peace because, although, yes, it is not 
explicitly at war with any other State, there still exists plenty of unorganized violence 
there. Not being openly at war, then, might be one form (or perhaps, let’s say, a necessary 
condition) for Canada to experience negative peace, it is not sufficient, because there is 
still a level of unorganized violence in Canada so that full negative peace does not exist 
there. 
 As we all know, however, there are other forms of violence besides and beyond 
direct, physical, personal violence. There are also indirect forms of violence that either 
shorten the life span of persons (or moral agents and patients) or that indirectly reduce the 
quality of life for them. There might be, for instance, social or economic structures in 
place that harm – directly or indirectly – the quality of life of persons. This could be 
organized, in the sense of, say, restrictions of civil liberties or civil freedoms, or it could 
be unorganized in the sense of, say, a culture of racism or social practices that curtail 
opportunities for some persons. The term “positive peace” is used when speaking of the 
absence of these forms and types of indirect violence. 
 Underlying these two types or notions of peace – that is, negative peace and 
positive peace – are the works of the noted Norwegian peace theorist Johann Galtung. As 
a point of departure in speaking of peace, Galtung defines “violence” as a state in which 
“human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations 
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are below their potential realizations.” Peace, then, would be a state in which those 
potentials are actualized. This definition, or at least characterization, is the underpinning 
of the earlier notions of negative peace and positive peace. For Galtung, one’s potentials 
are not realized, perhaps not even capable of being realized, in the context of war or other 
direct, physical violence. In addition, they are not realized, or perhaps even capable of 
being realized, in the context of indirect violence. People are not at peace if they are 
threatened, intimidated, inappropriately discriminated against, barred from economic or 
educational opportunities, etc. any more than they are not at peace if they are physically 
attacked, for Galtung. 
 In addition to identifying violence as the differential between one’s potentials and 
one’s realizations, Galtung spells out six dimensions of violence that he claims can 
comprise this differential. One dimension is that of physical and non-physical (what he 
specifically identifies as psychological) violence. We all know that threats can be just as 
effective at times as actual attacks in influencing someone’s behavior and actions. If a 
schoolyard bully can acquire another child’s lunch money with a threat rather than with 
actually hitting and taking the money, the result is the same and the victim is just as much 
a victim (and, for Galtung, is just as much lacking in being at peace). The second 
dimension of violence, for Galtung, is what he calls a negative vs. positive approach to 
influence. This is his way of speaking about negative vs. positive reinforcement, with 
negative reinforcement being punishment and positive reinforcement being reward. As 
with threats vs. attacks, rewards for “good” behavior (or policies) can bring about the 
same result as punishment for “bad” behavior. If the “good” behavior is in fact behavior 
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that promotes (or fails to reduce) the differential between one’s potentials and one’s 
realizations, then that person, for Galtung, is not fully at peace. 
 A third dimension of violence focuses on whether or not there is an object that 
can be hurt. No one need actually be hurt for there to be a state of violence. Again, in 
cases of threats, no actual harm need occur for relevant agents to be subject to violence. 
Galtung remarks that “the famous balance of power doctrine is based on efforts to obtain 
precisely this effect.” His fourth dimension is the flip side of the third; it focuses on 
whether or not there is a subject that acts to cause the violence. There might well be no 
specific actor or agent that causes the harm, even though harm is caused. For instance, 
economic structures and practices might well result in specific persons or groups being 
disadvantaged (and, hence, harmed in a way) without anyone (again, whether specific 
person or group) orchestrating the disadvantage. As Galtung puts it: if people are 
starving, violence is experienced, whether or not someone is trying to starve them.  
 Directly related to this concern is Galtung’s fifth dimension of violence, namely, 
intended vs. unintended violence. As Marx said (yes, it was Marx!): the road to hell is 
paved with good intentions. Some violence is and can be intended; other violence is and 
can happen even when not intended. Finally, for Galtung, there is manifest and latent 
violence. Manifest, of course, is open, recognizable violence. Latent violence, on the 
other hand, is not open or directly recognized. As we all know, the prevalence, say, of 
biases or stereotypes, can be latent yet harmful.  
 If, then, we take peace to be – as Galtung does – the state in which one’s 
potentials are in fact realized, then these dimensions of violence are meant to point out 
ways in which those potentials can be barred or obstructed or otherwise not met. How 
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does his characterization of peace, along with these dimensions of violence, play out 
when looking at the Middle East today? Can there be positive peace in the Middle East? 
 
3. Positive Peace in the Middle East 
We are all well aware of the organized violence in the Middle East. Iraq has been at war, 
essentially since 1980; first, in its eight-year war against Iran, followed immediately by 
the first U.S.-led conflict in the beginning of the 1990s, up to today. Since the creation of 
the modern state of Israel in the late 1940s (and, indeed, prior to that), armed conflict 
between Israel and neighboring Arab states, as well as with Palestinians, has been 
virtually non-stop for the past sixty years. Over the past several decades Lebanon has 
experienced a civil war, as has Algeria, as has Yemen. 
 However, the recent uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and elsewhere are as much 
about unrealized living conditions and opportunities as they are about direct, physical 
violence perpetrated by their governmental leaders. We do not hear of widespread unrest 
and angry protests in, say, the UAE or Qatar, even though these sheikhdoms are no more 
politically democratic (in the Western sense) than are Egypt or Algeria or Jordan. It is 
economic conditions of life – the rising costs of everyday commodities and the lack of 
opportunities for economic improvement, often because of structural, governmental 
corruption and cronyism – that are generating much (I would claim, most) of the unrest in 
the region. For example, according to the CIA Factbook (with data from the end of 2010), 
the per capita GDP for Algeria was $7300 USD, for Egypt $6200, for Syria $4800, for 
Yemen $2700, for Gaza $900. This compares to the United States figure of $47,200. (On 
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the other hand, the GDP for Bahrain was $40,300, for Kuwait was $48,900, for the UAE 
was $49,600, and for Qatar was $179,000; for Saudi Arabia it was $24,200.) 
Unemployment in the region for most of the countries (other than the Gulf 
countries of Qatar, UAE, Kuwait) were in the double digits, up to 35% in Yemen. It is 
less direct, physical violence, then, and more indirect absence of quality of life concerns 
for many in the region, especially the younger generation. This is not to say that they do 
not also live and feel the results of direct violence (e.g., Gaza). 
 What about Galtung’s dimensions? His first dimension was physical vs. non-
physical violence. Examples of this abound, but they are not universal across the region. 
For instance, the web of Israeli checkpoints throughout the West Bank, along with the 
difficulties they cause for simple daily travel, are only one example of what Palestinians 
see as emotional, psychological, and “spiritual” intimidation and humiliation they must 
endure every day. The presence and expansion of the Israeli Security Fence, including 
across lands that are not within the internationally-recognized 1967 borders, is another 
example (along with other land they see as illegally and immorally confiscated). The 
current young generation has known nothing but these conditions. 
 Galtung’s second dimension of violence was that of negative vs. positive 
reinforcement. Mubarek’s offer to name a vice-president, after thirty years of not having 
one, was a concession that he made to protesters. Although it was seen as a sham, it was 
an attempt to alter behavior with positive reinforcement. Israel’s stance of working with 
Fatah and its leader Abbas (while refusing to negotiate with Hamas) is seen as playing 
both positive and negative reinforcement for those respective parties. 
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 The third dimension of violence for Galtung was whether or not there was an 
object that was actually hurt. For many across the Middle East, it is the 
disenfranchisement and dismissal of groups that constitutes much of what they 
experience as lack of peace. This has had ethnic overtones, such as the treatment of 
Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Iran. It has had religious overtones, as Islamist groups 
in Egypt, Algeria, and other countries have claimed. Some Western-oriented, pro-
democracy groups have made the same claim vis-à-vis political Islamic power structures 
(that is, they have objected to, say, certain forms of imposition of shariah law). 
 Paralleling this dimension is Galtung’s fourth, which was whether or not there 
was a subject (that is, active agent) perpetrating the violence, or whether it was structural. 
Much of the present unrest and protest by the youth is that the problems and difficulties 
are in large part structural. Corruption and cronyism are seen by many as rampant; 
traditional practices and values are seen by many (again, especially among the young) as 
obstructive.  
 Galtung’s fifth dimension of violence speaks to intended vs. unintended violence. 
Recent polls show that, again, a major concern among many in the region is the failure of 
their leaders to provide conditions for a reasonable quality of everyday life. It is not 
intended, direct violence that is the major well of most of the unrest; it is the lack of 
resources and opportunities available for mundane, daily quality of life. A Brookings 
Institute poll that was conducted in July 2010 showed that across the region, and, 
interestingly, across generations, people in the Middle East saw lack of opportunity for 
self-improvement as a major concern and complaint. (Web page: 
http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2010/0805_arab_opinion_poll_telhami.aspx) 
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 Finally, Galtung’s sixth dimension of violence focused on manifest vs. latent 
conditions. Examples of manifest violence (both specific and structural) abound, 
involving both domestic and international sources. We are all aware of the cases of open 
hostility between Sunni and Shia, of armed repression of citizens by the military and 
political rulers and regimes in the region, not to mention military strikes and occupation 
by foreign powers in some areas. But, even more, much of the recent uprising that has 
swept the region speaks to the more latent conditions of violence: corruption, cronyism, 
intimidation, threats, failure of opportunity, etc. It is not mystery and it is no secret that 
these forms of violence are as real and as destructive as more manifest forms.  
This recognition of latent forms of violence can be, and has been, played out by 
leaders in the area. One telling example of this was a remark made during the Iranian 
Revolution of 1978/79. Ayatollah Khomeini had long complained of what he saw as the 
negative influences of western culture in Iran and one of his followers noted that “the 
Beatles are more dangerous than bombs.” The message was clear: social and cultural 
values that are seen as negative and even destructive are a form of latent violence. 
 
4. Missing dimensions 
In spite of what I think is right about Galtung’s understanding and analysis of peace and 
violence, I think his catalog of dimensions are inadequate, at least in the sense of being 
incomplete, to account for violence in the Middle East. In addition, I want to make clear 
that what I have been claiming is not simply that economic hardships are the sole cause 
of violence in the Middle East (or elsewhere, for that matter). Indeed, a great deal of 
violence is perpetrated by those who do not suffer economic hardship! What I have been 
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saying, however, is that the Arab Spring has sprung not merely as an effort to replace 
political dictatorships with western-style political democracies. The countries that have 
seen the lowest levels of social protest during the Arab Spring have, in fact, been the Gulf 
monarchies. This is not, I believe, because they have engaged in or even threatened 
severe retaliation for social protest, but because most of the citizens in those countries 
have not felt disenfranchised and have not endured economic hardships. This is not at all 
to say that there are not social, political, or even economic concerns related to those 
countries, but it is to say (again) that the drive for a particular form of political statehood 
is what underlies the Arab Spring.  
 What is driving the Arab Spring, I want to say, is a desire for positive peace, 
along the various dimensions of peace that Galtung outlines. However, I would like to 
add a further dimension of positive peace that I believe Galtung omits. It is the 
recognition and respect of identity, particularly group identity. The Sunni/Shia conflicts, 
for example, are not theological and are not ideological, except in the most trivial sense. 
They are no more theological than are the conflicts between Irish Catholics and Irish 
Protestants. Rather, they are much more about group identity and the opportunities for a 
flourishing life that goes hand-in-hand with social structures and attitudes associated with 
group identity. Are Kurds Kurds or are they Iraqis? Under Saddam they were treated as 
Kurds, as others, so being Kurdish mattered more than being Iraqi. Does being Shia in 
Bahrain matter (that is, in a country where the ruling family is Sunni although the 
majority of citizens are Shia)? Well, it matters when and if being Shia means being 
treated in particularly negative ways, when goods and services and opportunities are not 
distributed fairly or equitably – or at least not perceived as being distributed fairly or 
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equitably. So, it is less, I think, just a matter of political structure and more a matter of 
social opportunity and respect that drive the perceptions and realities of peace and 
violence – not only in the Middle East, but everywhere. As long as people believe that 
they are treated fairly and have a reasonable hope for achieving their aspirations, the form 
of their political structures will be non-controversial for them. And while economic well-
being is fundamental, its balance with fair and respectful treatment is even moreso. (As 
an analogy: One cares about substantive justice, but also about procedural justice. One 
might want distributive equality, but one can accept distributive inequalities as long as 
they result from a fair and open process. For example, only one person can win the 
lottery, but as long as all players believe that the process for selecting the winner is fair 
and open, the resulting distributive inequality is acceptable. Likewise, only one team can 
win the World Series in a given year, but as long as the officiating is fair and open, the 
result is acceptable.) As long as Jordanians or Bahrainis or Palestinians (or whomever) 
believe that they are treated fairly, in the sense that their well-being is not ignored or 
jeopardized by a system of unfair rules, then they will see their respective political (and 
economic) regimes and structures as legitimate. Galtung is right to insist on genuine 
peace as being framed in terms of the realizations of potentialities, but such realizations 
will occur only when respect for persons is taken as the core basis for flourishing. It is an 
old saw, but it bears repeating: Social justice is the key to conflict resolution and to 
genuine peace. A necessary component of social justice is a recognition and respect for 
salient identities. 
 
